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Abstract
Social cognition in humans is distinguished by psychological processes
that allow us to make inferences about what is going on inside other
people—their intentions, feelings, and thoughts. Some of these pro-
cesses likely account for aspects of human social behavior that are
unique, such as our culture and civilization. Most schemes divide social
information processing into those processes that are relatively automatic
and driven by the stimuli, versus those that are more deliberative and
controlled, and sensitive to context and strategy. These distinctions are
reﬂected in the neural structures that underlie social cognition, where
there is a recent wealth of data primarily from functional neuroimaging.
Here I provide a broad survey of the key abilities, processes, and ways
in which to relate these to data from cognitive neuroscience.
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KNOWLEDGE OF MINDS
The basic fact is thus that human beings are
able to pool their cognitive resources in ways
that other species are not . . . made possible by
a single very special form of social cognition,
namely, the ability of individual organisms to
understand conspeciﬁcs as beings like them-
selves who have intentional and mental lives
like their own. (Tomasello 1999)
Comparative Studies
We are an essentially social species; no compo-
nent of our civilization would be possible with-
out large-scale collective behavior. Yet much
of our social behavior arises from neurobio-
logical and psychological mechanisms shared
with other mammalian species, raising ques-
tions about why we are different. Part of this dif-
ference may arise from knowledge of our own
minds and those of others, a type of knowledge
different from that about the shared nonso-
cial environment, and in degree if not in kind
inaccessible and inconceivable to nonhuman
animals.
There are three broad domains of knowl-
edge that, taken together, seem to exhaust what
it is that we can know or conceive of know-
ing. The ﬁrst is the simplest to describe—it is
knowledge of the nonsocial environment, the
world we share with others. The common-
sense view is that this domain of knowledge
is shared, public, and hence objective in that
sense. How we come to acquire this knowledge
is also no mystery—through our senses and per-
ception of the world (although the acquisition
of such knowledge already depends on learn-
ing, selection, and categorization mechanisms
that are in part innate). Although the kinds of
inferences that we make about the world are
certainly complex, it seems that much of this
domain of knowledge is shared with other an-
imals. Like us, mice, cats, dogs, and monkeys
know about objects in the world, the proper-
ties they possess, and the events they transact;
they know something about which objects are
good and which are bad, and they direct their
behavior accordingly.
The second and third domains of knowl-
edge are more mysterious, and it is unclear to
what extent, if at all, other animals have ac-
cess to them. These are knowledge of other
minds, and knowledge of our own mind. Al-
though many biologists who study social be-
havior in animals treat their processing of so-
cial information as an issue in perception that
is just a special instance of the ﬁrst category
discussed above, some, especially those work-
ing with primates, focus on knowledge of one’s
own and others’ minds. Workhorse tasks have
been devised to assess the abilities in ques-
tion: deception as a test for knowledge of other
minds, and mirror self-recognition as a test for
self-knowledge.
Knowledge of the Minds of Others
One way of knowing about the social world,
of course, is through the same processes by
which we know about the nonsocial world.
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There is overwhelming evidence that many an-
imals are able to use social cues in sophisticated
ways, and primates especially are able to track
kinship and social rank over time (Cheney &
Seyfarth 1990, Silk 2005)—abilities that make
substantial demands on several cognitive do-
mains, such as episodic memory. But it is also
possible that the processes used for such so-
cial knowledge differ in important ways from
those engaged in nonsocial knowledge: Many of
these abilities look as if the animals were infer-
ring mental states by them. For instance, dogs,
unlike wolves, when faced with a problem that
they cannot solve, know to look back to their
owner in order to see what that person recom-
mends they do (Miklosi et al. 2003). Thus, they
know that the human “knows” something that
can help them if they need additional informa-
tion. Monkeys are able to distinguish human
actions that are intentional: They fail to show
any preference to eat from a bowl of food to
which a human points with an elbow (because
pointing with one’s elbow doesn’t make sense
normally), but they do show a preference to eat
from the bowl if a human points with an el-
bow while holding something else with both
hands (because in that case the hands are not
free to point and using the elbow makes sense)
(Wood et al. 2007). However one wants to inter-
pret these abilities, there is still doubt that they
are sufﬁcient to attribute a concept of “mind”
or “subjective” or “consciousness” to animals
(although, of course, higher animals do have
minds together with subjective conscious expe-
riences; it is just that they may not know that
they do).
There is a large literature on experiments in
our closest living relative, the chimpanzee, to
attempt to demonstrate that they really do have
a concept of other minds (although it is granted
that the chimp’s concept of mind would not be
the same as the human’s). The question was ﬁrst
posed explicitly in a famous article in the 1970s
(Premack & Woodruff 1978) and was followed
by a commentary in which philosopher Daniel
Dennett recommended what has since become
a common experimental strategy: To show that
an animal can conceive of minds (has a “the-
ory of mind”), one must demonstrate a con-
cept of false belief, which has been operational-
ized in animals as the ability to deceive. The
reasoning here is that one must decouple the
state of someone’s mind (e.g., what they believe)
from the state of the world (e.g., what they per-
ceive). There are fairly detailed experiments of
chimpanzee deception (Tomasello et al. 2003),
and it certainly appears to be the case that
chimpanzees are sensitive to what other chimps
know and are able behaviorally to deceive them,
although the interpretation of these ﬁndings re-
mains debated (Povinelli & Vonk 2003). Daniel
Povinelli has proposed an interesting experi-
ment that joins knowledge of other minds with
knowledge of one’s own mind and that could
be more decisive if it worked. Suppose we con-
struct a helmet one can wear, that looks from the
outside like a completely opaque bucket. Now,
without any prior interaction with a person
wearing one of these helmets, the chimp is given
a red and a blue helmet to wear itself. It turns
out that only the red helmet has a little moni-
tor inside that is hooked up to a video camera,
such that one can see what is in front of the hel-
met when one wears it. If the chimp, after hav-
ing experienced “seeing” itself while wearing
the red helmet, an experience completely novel
and hence not subject to any prior associations,
now begs for food from people wearing the red
but not the blue helmet, this could count as un-
ambiguous evidence that chimps can attribute
mental states to others, with extrapolation from
their own and unique conscious experience as
the sole source of the inference. So far, there is
no evidence that chimps can pass this test (Penn
& Povinelli 2007), although this negative ﬁnd-
ing can be criticized on a number of grounds in-
cluding the limited number of animals that have
been tested on it and its highly artiﬁcial nature
(compared to what chimps might be expected to
encounter in nature). In fact, it has been pointed
out that both the human samples often tested in
such experiments (white, middle-class, Western
humans) and the chimpanzee samples (captive
chimpanzees) are highly atypical (Boesch 2007),
making generalizations drawn from them
unclear.
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 695
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Knowledge of One’s Own Mind
Demonstrating knowledge of one’s own mind in
animals is at an even more problematic stage. A
classic test, mirror self-recognition, seems ad-
equate to show recognition of one’s own body
but insufﬁcient to show knowledge of one’s own
mind. Although it used to be thought that only
great apes could recognize their own body in a
mirror (Gallup 1970), such discrimination has
now been shown for monkeys (de Waal et al.
2005), dolphins (Reiss & Marino 2001), and
elephants (Plotnik et al. 2006). These tests, for
their complete assessment, rely on the ability of
the animal to behave on the basis of new self-
relevant information it recognizes in a mirror,
typically a colored mark of some kind on its
skin that the animal then examines. A related
set of tests are those for episodic memory, which
are presumed to require projecting oneself into
the past in order to re-experience it. Likewise
related are tests for future episodic planning,
which requires pre-experiencing something by
projecting oneself into the future. As with de-
ception and mirror self-identiﬁcation, the ev-
idence that animals can mentally travel out-
side of the present remains unclear (Emery &
Clayton 2004, Roberts et al. 2008). What all
these abilities share in common with the ability
to know other minds is the ﬂexible adoption of
a point of view that is different (in space, time,
or person) from the way one currently experi-
ences the world. As such, they require the ability
to make a distinction between world and mind,
between objective and subjective. Although sev-
eral animals can behave in very ﬂexible ways that
support some such ability, it remains unclear
whether they truly are able to (a) experience
a point of view that they deliberately imagine,
(b) distinguish this experience from their own
experience in the here and now, and (c) derive
from this distinction a concept of “mind” of
some sort.
Yet in typical adult humans there is no doubt
whatsoever that we have knowledge of other
minds and our own, and much of the research
has focused on the detailed mechanisms that
underlie these abilities rather than on demon-
strations that we have them at all [although
work in infants and children, not treated here,
does focus on the age at which these abilities
ﬁrst emerge and how they develop (Blakemore
2008, Striano & Reid 2006); likewise, work in
clinical populations such as autism focuses on
whether and to what extent they are present
(Baron-Cohen 1997, Frith 2001)]. The mecha-
nisms are of great interest because they seem to
require something different from, or additional
to, the mechanisms that mediate our knowl-
edge of the shared nonsocial environment. In
the case of knowledge of other minds, we ap-
pear to begin with much the same information
as for nonsocial objects—perception of a face,
say—but then go on to make inferences that
are unique: We infer emotions, intentions, and
beliefs of the other person, none of which we
can directly observe because they are internal,
relational, or dispositional states in some way.
This ability is referred to as “theory of mind”
(Leslie 1987, Premack & Woodruff 1978). Our
propensity to take this stance toward explain-
ing intentional systems, whether human or not,
is inﬂuenced by such factors as our motivation
to understand a system and to connect with it
socially (Epley et al. 2007).
Most puzzling of all is self-knowledge. Un-
like the other two forms of knowledge, self-
knowledge typically doesn’t rely on perceptual
observation at all, or at least not on telorecep-
tive perception. We know what we experience,
believe, and think without relying on any ob-
servational inference, with the result that we are
authoritative about our own minds in a way that
other people, whose knowledge of our mind
necessarily relies on observational evidence,
could never be (which is not to say we are incor-
rigible on any particular occasion). So what is
the source of input that constitutes the evidence
on the basis of which we know what is going on
in our own minds? One interesting idea is that
the source is not sensory at all, but rather is
motor in nature. We know what we feel, think,
and believe because these are activities that we
initiate and about which we can talk to others.
This idea has been taken up by some philoso-
phers who emphasize social communication
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and learning as an essential ingredient to giv-
ing content to mental states (Davidson 1987),
by neuroscience theories of consciousness that
argue sensory consciousness requires relay of
information to the prefrontal cortex for ac-
tion planning (Crick & Koch 1995), and by so-
cial neuroscientists who study intentional ac-
tion and how our sense of agency allows us
to understand others as responsible conscious
beings (Frith 2007a).
The Consequences
for Human Behavior
Although apes have group-speciﬁc reposito-
ries and transmission of social information that
qualify as rudimentary cultures (Whiten et al.
1999), humans alone seem to have language and
civilization, and no other mammal has come
close to transforming the planet in the way we
have. Yet the abilities that underlie this patent
social difference remain unclear. Studies show-
ing that great apes are worse than human chil-
dren on tests of social cognition (Herrmann
et al. 2007), especially social learning, even
when they are equated with respect to nonsocial
cognitive abilities, support the idea that human
social cognition is special, perhaps in particular
with regard to how we can learn through imi-
tation. However, these studies, like all the oth-
ers reviewed in the previous section, are heavily
debated (for example, it is argued they may be
too artiﬁcial to demonstrate the social cognitive
skills that primates could exhibit in the wild, and
solid evidence from ﬁeld studies is incredibly
difﬁcult to obtain).
One set of behaviors that are being
intensively investigated by anthropologists,
economists, and biologists are those that pro-
duce cooperation (Gintis et al. 2003). Chim-
panzees appear to have social cognitive abilities
that are more adapted to competition than to
cooperation (Hare & Tomasello 2004), and they
show little spontaneous inclination to help oth-
ers (Silk et al. 2005). There may be nonrecip-
rocal altruistic behaviors and altruistic punish-
ment (Fehr & Gaechter 2002) that occur only
in humans. These abilities depend on a concept
of other minds, contribute to reputation and
social status, and are critical to aspects of hu-
man society and its evolution. We both help and
punish others, depending on the circumstances,
even when these come at a cost to ourselves and
even for unrelated people, when this is seen as
fair, right, or for the greater good. One class of
psychological processes that may mediate such
behaviors is the moral emotions—strong moti-
vational states, such as pity, pride, or guilt, that
link perception of certain classes of social events
to actions based on what we judge to be right
or wrong.
SOCIAL PROCESSES
AND SOCIAL BRAIN
Controlled and Automatic Processing
The currently dominant view among many cog-
nitive psychologists and neuroscientists pro-
poses two broad sets of processes: those that
are controlled and those that are automatic.
One could add a third category: those that me-
diate between controlled and automatic pro-
cesses. The dichotomous scheme is summa-
rized in a recent review (Lieberman 2007),
which enumerates the various properties at-
tributed to controlled and automatic process-
ing. Controlled processes have long been as-
signed a host of other attributes: They are slow,
effortful, reﬂective, arise late in evolution and
development, and often involve language-based
declarative reasoning and reﬂective thinking.
Automatic processes are thought to be faster,
spontaneous, reﬂexive, shared in common with
a wide range of species and dominant early in
development, and often involve emotions. The
automatic nature of social cognition has often
been stressed, since a large literature supports
effects on social judgment and behavior that
occur without deliberate reﬂection (Bargh &
Ferguson 2000, Fiske & Taylor 2008). Yet so-
phisticated views of automaticity acknowledge
that, although it is unintentional, automatic
processing can be quite diverse and rich in na-
ture (Bargh & Morsella 2008). Regardless of
how one carves up the terrain, it seems apparent
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 697
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that both kinds of processes patently contribute
to social cognition: Much of it is rapid and
fraught with biases and stereotypes of which we
may be unaware, consistent with automatic pro-
cessing; at the same time, a hallmark of human
social cognition is our ability to deploy behavior
strategically—either to contribute toward the
greater good of a society despite selﬁsh incli-
nations to do otherwise, or to manipulate and
deceive others who are trying to predict our
behavior.
A large literature has examined the interac-
tion between these two sets of processes. Cog-
nitive control and regulation, abilities that de-
velop relatively late throughout childhood and
adolescence, appear to have evolved relatively
recently (Braver & Barch 2006). One index of
such control is the duration over which a stim-
ulus can be decoupled from an action toward
it, such as is seen in temporal discounting of re-
wards. Such discounting functions are relatively
steep for most animals, longer for primates,
and longest for humans, who can plan ahead
over long time periods to delay obtaining an
ultimate reward. Another example of cognitive
control is emotion regulation, the ability to alter
one’s emotional response, expression, and in-
deed experience, volitionally—a process whose
dysfunction in adults contributes to mood dis-
orders (Ochsner & Gross 2005). There is also
evidence for interaction in the opposite direc-
tion. Theories of decision-making, in particu-
lar, have recently argued that automatic, and
often emotional, processing inﬂuences deliber-
ate choices (Damasio 1994). In a similar vein,
studies in the social psychology of stereotyp-
ing have shown that our opinions of, and be-
havior toward, other people are often inﬂu-
enced by covert attitudes that were triggered
rapidly and automatically. For instance, social
judgments such as trustworthiness can be made
from very brief presentations of faces (Bar et al.
2006, Willis & Todorov 2006) that are thought
to activate automatic schemas for the rapid, on-
line evaluation of others. One very provocative
study found that brief presentations of the faces
of real, but unfamiliar, politicians could gener-
ate reliable judgments of how competent these
politicians looked, without any additional in-
formation. Amazingly, such competence judg-
ments based solely on the appearance of a face
correlated (weakly but signiﬁcantly) with real-
world election outcomes for those politicians
(Todorov et al. 2005).
Dimensions speciﬁc to social evaluation
have also been proposed: Two universal dimen-
sions of how we perceive and judge other people
are competence and warmth (Fiske et al. 2007).
These two dimensions capture much about how
others might be disposed toward us and thus
help us to predict their likely behavior. Per-
haps one of the best examples of social cogni-
tion that demonstrates the rich interaction be-
tween seemingly opposite sets of processes is
moral judgment. We judge actions to be right
or wrong, and the people who carry them out
to be good or bad, based on emotion, inference,
automatic and reﬂective processing, and a host
of processes that have evolved to subserve reci-
procity, fairness, loyalty, respect, and other be-
havioral dispositions (Haidt 2007). Many of the
distinctions between processes that have been
made at the level of cognitive psychology are
now being informed by data from neuroscience,
which drives home the point of rich interaction
even more.
A further consideration regarding the pro-
cesses that subserve social behavior comes from
anthropological and comparative data, which
can be used to argue for those aspects of so-
cial behavior that may be disproportionate to
humans, and to provide a corresponding link
to those features of the brain that may be dis-
proportionate to humans. We review some of
these data in the next section and then turn to
the neurobiology.
The Social Brain
The social brain hypothesis attempts to ex-
plain the extraordinary size and complexity of
the human brain by appeal to particular pres-
sures that a species adapted to social inter-
action would have had to face, ranging from
deception to cooperation to ways of obtain-
ing food and ensuring offspring (Allman 1999;
698 Adolphs
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Barrett & Henzi 2005; Dunbar 1998; Dunbar
& Schultz 2007a,b). In part, this is a chicken-
and-egg question: Did greater general cogni-
tive abilities and intelligence drive our social
cognition, or did social cognition enable our
intelligence in general (Roth & Dicke 2005)?
The evolution of human brain size to its present
1.3 kg is notable for tremendous acceleration on
an evolutionarily quite recent timescale, with
major increases within less than a million years
ago (Ruff et al. 1997). By comparison, the brain
size of the great ape species closest in evolution
to humans, such as chimpanzees and bonobos,
is only 25%–35% of modern human brain size
(about the size of the brain our hominid ances-
tors would likely have had about four million
years ago), although body size is comparable.
Given the increased maternal investment re-
quired to produce offspring with large brains,
and the increased metabolic costs of maintain-
ing a large brain (Isler & van Schaik 2006), the
central puzzles of human brain evolution are:
Why so large, and how could this possibly have
taken place so recently?
Responses to these puzzles have often in-
voked presumptively special aspects of our so-
cial behavior. Byrne & Whiten (1988) were
among the ﬁrst to argue in favor of complex so-
cial environments as the primary selective pres-
sure for human brain size and later included all
aspects of social problem solving, both prosocial
and deceitful, in their proposal, the “social brain
hypothesis” (Dunbar 1998, Whiten & Byrne
1997). One class of empirical tests for this hy-
pothesis seeks to determine whether those brain
regions that differ most in size between humans
and apes correspond to regions important for
social cognition. Such analyses have pointed
to the prefrontal cortex. Though the frontal
cortex as a whole is not differentially enlarged
in humans as compared to apes (Semendeferi
et al. 2002), humans have a comparatively larger
frontal polar cortex (Semendeferi et al. 2001) as
well as more subtle increases in insular and tem-
poral cortices (Semendeferi & Damasio 2000).
Additional empirical tests of the social brain hy-
pothesis focus on operationalizing social com-
plexity in ways that include size of the over-
all group, size of an average grooming clique,
size and frequency of temporally limited sub-
groups (e.g., coalitions), number and complex-
ity of mating strategies, frequency and com-
plexity of social play, frequency and complexity
of deception, and the extent of social learning
(Dunbar & Schultz 2007b). Some of these anal-
yses suggest that prevalence of prosocial behav-
iors, speciﬁcally pair bonding behaviors, explain
more variance in brain size than do other types
of social complexity.
A ﬁnal point of interest that brings together
evolutionary and developmental aspects of hu-
man brain size is that humans are highly altri-
cial: The brains of newborns are very immature,
and our development, notably including social
development, occurs over a protracted period of
many years. One way of appreciating this fact is
to note that human brains are only about 25%
their adult volume at birth—constraints im-
posed in part by our bipedal nature and the evo-
lution of the female pelvis, the shape of which
limits the size of a newborn’s head. By compar-
ison, chimpanzee brains are nearly 50% their
adult size at birth, and macaque monkey brains
are about 70% of their adult size at birth. These
differences in the size of the neonatal brain
relative to the adult brain mirror the species’
differences in the length of their development
and their dependency on social support during
this development. A recently found skull from a
1.8 million-year-old hominid child provided
evidence that our ancestors had a cranial capac-
ity at birth that is essentially like that of apes
rather than like that of modern humans. This
ﬁnding provides further evidence of a change in
brain development that occurred relatively re-
cently and that may be one of the features deﬁn-
ing the evolution of our species (Coqueugnlot
et al. 2004).
Social Modules?
Outlining the brain structures that partici-
pate in social cognition raises the question of
whether these structures are in any sense spe-
cialized for processing social information or
whether social cognition is just like cognition
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 699
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FACE PROCESSING AND MODULARITY
One side of an argument about modularity has found responses
with a region of the ventral temporal cortex in the fusiform gyrus,
dubbed the fusiform face area (FFA), that are larger to faces than
to any other visual object category (Kanwisher et al. 1997). The
modularity of face processing is further supported by psycho-
logical effects unique to faces, such as disruption of processing
with inversion, and by single neuron responses in the monkey
brain selective to faces (Kanwisher & Yovel 2006, Tsao et al.
2006). However, the FFA also can be activated by nonface objects
provided that subjects acquire substantial expertise with them,
such as birds, cars, or butterﬂies in experts for those categories
(Gauthier et al. 2000). Although the disproportionate activation
by faces argues for a domain-speciﬁc module specialized to pro-
cess a particular category of stimuli (faces) (Kanwisher 2000), the
other data argue for a particular type of processing rather than
processing for a particular stimulus category (Tarr & Gauthier
2000) (cf. Figure 1). Other imaging data have argued that faces
are never represented in a single cortical region, but in a dis-
tributed region of cortex considerably more extensive than the
FFA (Haxby et al. 2001). However, when competing stimuli are
present, as would happen in naturally cluttered environments,
the FFA indeed does seem to show a special selectivity for faces
(Reddy & Kanwisher 2007).
in general, only applied to the domain of so-
cial behavior. There are some a priori reasons
for thinking that we might have evolved spe-
cialized systems, because social behavior makes
demands that are so unique. It requires rapid
identiﬁcation of social stimuli and signals (such
as recognition of people and their disposi-
tions toward us), vast integration of memory
(to keep track of who is friend and foe based
on past experience), anticipation of others’
behavior in a reciprocal and often competi-
tive setting (to generate the unique kind of
knowledge outlined in the ﬁrst section of this
review), and the generation of normative eval-
uations (to motivate social behavior such as al-
truistic punishment). Each of these four exam-
ples has been proposed as a unique aspect of
human cognition, and one might hypothesize
that each is subserved by a specialized evolved
ability, or “module” (Barkow et al. 1992, Pinker
1997).
Modules have been proposed for how we
process faces (see sidebar Face Processing and
Modularity), for parametrically perceiving ge-
netic relatedness (kinship) (Lieberman et al.
2007), and for detecting people who cheat on
social contracts (Cosmides & Tooby 1992), an
appealing idea from an evolutionary point of
view, since such modules might be expected to
facilitate human cooperation, altruistic punish-
ment, and social norm compliance that regulate
our ability to function in large groups. A com-
mon mechanism thought to mediate between
perceptual detection and action is the moti-
vation afforded by strong, often moral, emo-
tions. One example is that the length of co-
habitation with a member of the opposite sex
calibrates perception of kinship, and correlates
with the strength of moral opposition to incest
(Lieberman et al. 2003). Moral judgments
more generally show many of the features of
automatic processing, often appear relatively
modular in nature (Hauser 2006), and typi-
cally involve strong emotions (Greene & Haidt
2002, Haidt 2001), although it remains unclear
whether the emotions are a cause or conse-
quence of the judgment. In thinking about the
extent to which social cognition might be spe-
cial in some way, it is useful to distinguish such
specialization at the level of the domain of in-
formation that is being processed (such as face
perception) or at the level of the processes that
are engaged (whether they are general purpose
or special purpose) (Atkinson et al. 2008). This
is schematized in Figure 1.
NEUROSCIENCE OF SOCIAL
COGNITION
Perceiving Social Stimuli
The neural substrates of social cognition (see
Figure 2a) are the topic of the rapidly growing
ﬁeld of social cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner
2007, Ochsner & Lieberman 2001), a subdo-
main of the broader ﬁeld of social neuroscience
(Cacioppo 1994, Cacioppo et al. 2001). One of
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the earliest reviews to summarize the compo-
nents of a social brain proposed an initial set
of structures thought to be involved in social
behavior: the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cor-
tex, and the temporal poles (Brothers 1990).
More recent reviews have included additional
structures and added putative roles for them
(Adolphs 2003, Cacioppo et al. 2007, Fiske &
Taylor 2008, Frith 2007b, Frith & Frith 2007,
Lieberman 2007). In one scheme (Figure 2b),
early sensory cortices, as well as subcortical
structures such as the amygdala, feed sensory
information (in parallel routes) to a mosaic of
cortical regions that analyze particular aspects
of a stimulus or particular stimulus categories
such as faces or bodies.
At the input end, we know by far the most
about how socially relevant information is pro-
cessed in the visual modality, although progress
has been made for audition as well (Belin 2006).
There is good evidence for conscious as well as
nonconscious routes. The consciously accessi-
ble route is thought to depend on visual cortices
in the temporal lobe that process object iden-
tity and that exhibit some interesting selectiv-
ity for social stimuli such as faces (see sidebar
Face Processing and Modularity). A subcorti-
cal route through the superior colliculus, the
mammalian homologue of the optic tectum (the
primary visual pathway in amphibians, reptiles,
and birds), is thought to be sufﬁcient for visual
processing whose results are not consciously
accessible. For instance, when face stimuli are
shown to one eye while a ﬂickering checker-
board pattern is shown to the other eye, view-
ers are at chance in detecting the face stimulus
even though it is present on one retina, and even
though different emotional expressions shown
on the invisible face stimulus result in differ-
ential activation of some brain regions ( Jiang
& He 2006). Two of these brain regions show-
ing responses to unseen faces are the superior
temporal sulcus, a region of visually responsive
cortex, and the amygdala, a collection of nuclei
in the medial temporal lobe, discussed further
below.
Within the modality of touch, there are also
distinct processing channels. Some of these,
Domain
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Domain
general
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purpose
General
purpose
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        (selectivity)
Figure 1
Is social cognition special? Debates about the modularity of social information
processing often revolve around the two dimensions shown in this schematic: Is
the specialization at the level of processing algorithms (functional
specialization) or at the level of the type of information being processed
(stimulus selectivity)? A mechanism might be functionally monolithic and
apply to a restricted set of stimuli (region 1) or applicable to a large domain of
different kinds of stimuli (region 2). Alternatively, a mechanism might
contribute to several distinct processes, but in the service of processing either a
restricted stimulus class (region 3) or many (region 4). (Modiﬁed from
Atkinson et al. 2008, Wheeler & Atkinson 2001.)
which signal interoceptive bodily information
that subserves how we feel, are discussed further
below. There also appears to be an exterocep-
tive channel that, unlike the main touch path-
way, does not permit touch discrimination but is
able to signal the social-emotional component
of touch, such as a caress (Olausson et al. 2002).
This pathway appears to rely on particular
afferent channels that relay somatosensory in-
formation to the insula, a structure involved in
affective processing and empathy, which we dis-
cuss below. Another sensory modality that may
feature distinct channels, but about which rela-
tively little is known in humans, is our sense of
smell. In other mammals, there are two primary
pathways—one through the olfactory bulb, the
other through the vomeronasal system—both
of which are involved in social and sexual be-
havior (Lin et al. 2005). There is some evidence
in humans that aspects of our behavior can be
inﬂuenced by odors without conscious aware-
ness (Stern & McClintock 1998), and activation
of brain regions involved in emotion has been
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 701
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Right hemisphere
(dorsal aspect)
Left hemisphere
(dorsal aspect)
Ventral aspect
Right hemisphere
(medial aspect)
Coronal cut
(dissected to 
reveal insula)
Figure 2a
Processes and brain structures involved in social cognition. Brain structures
involved in social cognition. This is, of course, an incomplete list and
emphasizes those structures discussed in the review and outlined in Figure 2b.
(Top left) A right lateral view of a brain that shows somatosensory cortices and
superior temporal gyrus regions; roughly between them and posterior would be
the temporoparietal junction, which is not shaded to preserve clarity of the
ﬁgure. (Top right) Left prefrontal regions are also involved in making
personality attributions to others, and indicated again here is the superior
temporal gyrus, involved in processes such as biological motion. Below these
images are a picture of the insula, revealed when the frontal operculum is
removed, and below that, a ventral view of the brain showing medial prefrontal
cortex (in this ventral view, medial orbitofrontal cortex) and, more posteriorly,
the fusiform gyrus, involved in face processing. Below that, a medial view of the
right hemisphere shows the anterior cingulate and again the medial prefrontal
cortex. If one takes a coronal section along the line indicated, this cut reveals
the amygdala in the medial temporal lobe (very bottom image).
found in response to putative pheromone odors
(Savic et al. 2001), but the extent to which ol-
factory social cues play a role in everyday life
remains unclear.
Evaluating Social Stimuli
The amygdala. The observation (mentioned
in the previous section) that stimuli that cannot
be consciously perceived still result in discrim-
inative activation of the amygdala, has led to
the idea that the amygdala can provide rapid
and automatic processing that could bias so-
cial cognition. Indeed, its activation is corre-
lated with racial stereotypes of which viewers
are unaware (Phelps et al. 2000). Its role in social
cognition has been studied most extensively in
regard to judgments we make about other peo-
ple from their faces. Lesion studies found that
damage to the amygdala results in an impaired
ability to recognize emotional facial expressions
(Adolphs et al. 1994), an initial ﬁnding that has
been followed by a large literature documenting
the amygdala’s involvement in both appetitive
and aversive emotional processing (Aggleton
2000). The amygdala has also been emphasized
historically as a structure important for that
emotional processing that contributes to so-
cial behavior (Kluver & Bucy 1939), another
strand in modern research on the amygdala.
Recently, at least some of this role has been
argued to be due to a more abstract function
for the amygdala in general arousal and vigi-
lance (Whalen 1999): It appears to be impor-
tant to evaluate stimuli as salient because they
are unpredictable, because they have been asso-
ciated with reward or punishment, or because
they signal potentially important information.
For instance, the impaired recognition of facial
expressions of fear in a patient with amygdala
lesions (Adolphs et al. 1994) was found to re-
sult from an inability to guide one’s gaze and
visual attention to features in faces normally
salient to recognize such expressions, notably
the eye region of the face (Adolphs et al. 2005)
(Figure 3). Another study found that sequences
of unpredictable tones elicited greater amyg-
dala activation, compared with predictable
tones, even when no overt rewarding or punish-
ing outcomes were associated with those tones
(Herry et al. 2007). These recent ﬁndings sup-
port earlier ideas that the amygdala is involved
in vigilance for stimuli (in all sensory modali-
ties) that are potentially salient because they are
ambiguous or unpredictable (Whalen 2007).
Other people may exemplify stimuli of that
sort.
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Ven-
tral and medial regions of the prefrontal
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cortex, which encompass a number of intercon-
nected regions that process reward and punish-
ment, regulate emotion, and maintain home-
ostasis (O¨ngu¨r & Price 2000), have been linked
to social behavior ever since the historical case
of Phineas Gage, a nineteenth-century railroad
worker who had an iron rod blasted through the
front of his head in an accident (Damasio et al.
1994). Not only did Gage survive, but his per-
sonality also changed from shrewd, persistent,
and respectable to profane, capricious, and un-
reliable after the accident [although the histor-
ical details of this account have been the topic
of some debate (MacMillan 2000)]. The asso-
ciation of impairments in social behavior with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) dam-
age has since been investigated in much greater
detail. Perhaps the most illustrative modern ex-
ample is patient EVR (Damasio 1994, Eslinger
& Damasio 1985). At age 35, EVR underwent
resection of a bilateral orbitofrontal menin-
gioma. Most of the VMPC, on both sides of
the brain, was lesioned with the tumor resec-
tion. Following the surgery, EVR exhibited a
remarkable decline in his personal and profes-
sional life, including two divorces, the loss of
his job, and bankruptcy. Despite the gross alter-
ation of his social conduct and decision-making,
neuropsychological testing indicates EVR’s in-
tellectual abilities remained unchanged (Saver
& Damasio 1991). Subsequent group studies of
patients with damage to the VMPC have iden-
tiﬁed typical personality changes: blunted af-
fect, poor frustration tolerance, impaired goal-
directed behavior, inappropriate social conduct,
and marked lack of insight into these changes
(Barrash et al. 2000). Further experimental
work has demonstrated that VMPC damage
impairs autonomic responses to emotionally
charged pictures (e.g., mutilated bodies, nudes)
(Damasio et al. 1990) as well as to emotional
memories. Studies involving gambling games
indicate that VMPC patients experience dimin-
ished emotional arousal before making risky
choices (Bechara et al. 1996), as well as dimin-
ished regret when considering alternate out-
comes after making risky choices (Camille et al.
2004). In such games, patients with lesions to
Figure 3
Abstract functions of the amygdala contribute to social perception. Bilateral
amygdala lesions impair the use of the eyes and gaze to the eyes during
emotion judgment. (a) A patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala made
signiﬁcantly less use of information from the eye region of faces when judging
emotion. (b) While looking at whole faces, the patient (right column of images)
exhibited abnormal face gaze, making far fewer ﬁxations to the eyes than did
controls (left column of images). This was observed across emotions (free
viewing, emotion judgment, gender discrimination). (c) Magnetic resonance
imaging scan of the patient’s brain, whose lesion was relatively restricted to the
entire amygdala, a very rare lesion in humans. The two round black regions
near the top middle of the image are the lesioned amygdalae. (d ) When the
subject was instructed to look at the eyes (“SM eyes”) in a whole face, she could
do this, resulting in a remarkable recovery in ability to recognize the facial
expression of fear. The ﬁndings show that an apparent role for the amygdala in
processing fearful facial expressions is in fact more abstract and involves the
detection of, and attentional direction onto, features that are socially
informative. (Modiﬁed from Adolphs et al. 2005).
the VMPC persistently make disadvantageous
choices. These results support an inﬂuential
theory about the role of emotion in decision-
making (including social decision-making), the
so-called somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio
1994, 1996). The hypothesis argues that emo-
tional signals, mediated in part by regions in the
VMPC, can be elicited by the anticipation or
consideration of the future outcomes of one’s
actions, and that this signal guides the deci-
sion that is made. There has been vigorous de-
bate about whether these emotional signals are
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 703
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conscious or not (Bechara et al. 2005, Maia &
McClelland 2004), with the current status being
that they need not be conscious in order to in-
ﬂuence behavior, although they can be brought
into consciousness depending on the task in the
experiment (Persaud et al. 2007).
Experimental tests that directly assess so-
cial knowledge provide further support for the
role of VMPC in social cognition. Patients
with VMPC damage have deﬁcits in interpret-
ing nonverbal social information such as fa-
cial expression, gestures, or body posture, even
though they typically have preserved declara-
tive knowledge of basic social and moral norms.
Contextual interpretation of complex social in-
formation, such as judging faux pas and sar-
casm, as well as aspects of moral judgment, is
impaired as well (Beer et al. 2003, Hornak et al.
1996, Koenigs et al. 2007). In particular, dam-
age to the VMPC appears to result in an in-
ability to recognize social faux pas and reduces
empathic concern for others (Shamay-Tsoory
et al. 2003), an impairment that arises from the
emotional contributions made by the VMPC
to social cognition as opposed to other factors
(such as perspective taking or theory of mind)
(Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2005). Studies of moral
cognition mentioned elsewhere in this review
underscore the importance of VMPC in so-
cial decision-making (Koenigs et al. 2007, Moll
et al. 2005).
Although the majority of studies have fo-
cused on, and the largest effects have been
found for, patients who have bilateral damage
to the VMPC, unilateral damage also causes
the pattern of impairments described above,
only milder. There appears to be an interesting
asymmetry in that unilateral right-sided lesions
seem to cause a more severe impairment than
do unilateral left-sided lesions, an effect that
was also seen in one of the studies cited above
(Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2005). A further wrinkle
on this story is that unilateral right lesions are
more severe than left in males, whereas unilat-
eral left lesions may be more severe than right
in females (Tranel et al. 2005).
Patients with early-onset damage involv-
ing VMPC are a unique resource for inves-
tigating the development of social cognition.
Like patients with adult-onset damage, indi-
viduals acquiring VMPC damage in infancy or
early childhood manifest defects in social con-
duct and decision-making despite intact lan-
guage, memory, and IQ. However, the social
defects following early-onset VMPC damage
appear more severe than in the adult-onset
cases. Common features include apathy and un-
concern; lack of guilt, empathy, or remorse;
violent outbursts; lewd and irresponsible be-
havior; and petty criminal behavior together
with a profound lack of awareness of these
behavioral problems (Anderson et al. 2000).
Unlike adult-onset cases, early-onset VMPC
patients may have impaired knowledge of social
and moral conventions (Anderson et al. 1999,
2000). These results indicate that the VMPC
is critically involved in the acquisition of so-
cial and moral knowledge during development.
Adult-onset VMPC patients, who presumably
undergo normal social development, retain
declarative access to social facts, but they appear
to lose access to emotional signals that are nec-
essary to guide appropriate on-line social and
decision-making behavior in real-life situations.
Early-onset VMPC patients seem to have never
acquired appropriate levels of factual social
knowledge in the ﬁrst place, nor do they have
access to normal online emotional process-
ing, resulting in an even greater level of social
impairment.
Empathy and simulation. One feature of hu-
man cognition is a rerepresentation of both sen-
sory and motor information in order to permit
more ﬂexible behavior. For instance, a remap-
ping of interoceptive information about the
state of one’s own body may allow humans and
other primates to construct explicit representa-
tions of how they feel, and to know and con-
sequently regulate how they feel in a ﬂexible
way. This remapping has been proposed to rely
on relays of interoceptive processing into the
insula, and a further remapping within the an-
terior insula is thought to consolidate body-
state information about oneself with social and
contextual information to provide a neural
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substrate of the conscious experience of emo-
tions (Craig 2002, 2008). This region of the
brain has been found to be activated in a large
number of studies that involve other people, or
information about other people, as the stim-
uli. For instance, observing the hand of a loved
one receive a painful electric shock will activate
the insula in the brain of the perceiver (Singer
et al. 2004). This and other studies have tied
the insula not only to the experience of one’s
own emotions, but also to the empathic feeling
of others’ emotions: one way in which we know
what is going on inside other people is to simu-
late aspects of what is happening in their brain
(Keysers & Gazzola 2007). Associating our ob-
servations of other people with representations
of our own internal states, motivations, and
intentions is hypothesized to be a general
mechanism whereby we are able to generate
knowledge of other minds (Keysers & Perrett
2004).
Mirroring other people can be entirely au-
tomatic, go unnoticed, and form one basis for
learning about the world through others. For
instance, the amygdala we discussed above has
been classically shown to be necessary for ac-
quiring Pavlovian fear conditioning, but it also
turns out to be important for learning to fear
a stimulus merely by observing another per-
son experience its consequences (Olsson et al.
2007)—an effect that, like classical fear con-
ditioning, can take place even when the stim-
uli cannot be consciously perceived (Olsson
& Phelps 2004). In a study with rats, a naive
observer rat that had not been subjected to aver-
sive stimuli of any kind nonetheless showed
discriminatory activation within the amygdala
when it interacted with another rat, depend-
ing on whether or not that other rat had ex-
perienced electric shock (Knapska et al. 2006).
These ﬁndings are in line with a large litera-
ture in social psychology conﬁrming that we
automatically and often nonconsciously pick
up social signals from others. When we be-
come aware that these signals are signals, more
uniquely human forms of social cooperativity
and deception may appear, and the knowingly
shared conscious experience opens up forms of
social learning on which culture can build (Frith
& Frith 2007).
Empathy and emotion do not only include
feelings, but they also motivate us to act, for
instance when empathy causes sympathy (de
Vignemont & Singer 2006). In its most
schematic form, information would be expected
to ﬂow from high-level sensory representations
that contribute to conscious experience of the
world and our bodies, to high-level premotor
representations that motivate action. The an-
terior cingulate cortex is one structure that is
thought to receive high-level information about
expected and actual sensory events, to monitor
conﬂicts (Botvinick et al. 2004), and to inte-
grate this with emotional information to moti-
vate behavior (Craig 2008). It is activated in a
number of experiments in which strong emo-
tional information [such as pain (Vogt 2005) or
social exclusion (Eisenberger et al. 2003)] lead
to an interruption of ongoing processing and
motivate a behavioral change (Devinsky et al.
1995). It appears to play a role at a high level of
behavioral regulation in that it can adjust gen-
eral learning about environmental contingen-
cies when their reliability changes through time
(Behrens et al. 2007)—presumably also an im-
portant role in updating our social information
from other people.
Several other regions within the prefrontal
cortex are routinely activated when people ex-
perience strong emotions and when they are
motivated to take actions based on those emo-
tions. These regions are all connected with the
anterior cingulate cortex, include dorsolateral
as well as ventromedial sectors of prefrontal
cortex, and have been implicated in reward-
based learning and instrumental behavior in
both cooperative and competitive social inter-
actions. They have also been highlighted as im-
plementing one way in which emotions can mo-
tivate moral, altruistic, and socially regulatory
behaviors (Damasio 1994, 2003). For instance,
a network of orbitofrontal and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex is activated when punishment by
others induces social norm compliance (Spitzer
et al. 2007), and lesions to the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex result in impaired social
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 705
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emotions, impaired social functioning in the
real world, and an abnormal skew toward mak-
ing utilitarian moral judgments when moral
emotions and rational considerations are in
conﬂict (Koenigs et al. 2007).
Emotions motivate behavior; thus, simulat-
ing other people’s emotions provides us with
one strategy for predicting what they are likely
to do. A complementary strategy is to sim-
ulate aspects of the premotor representations
that would normally accompany goal-directed
behavior, a mechanism supported by ﬁnd-
ing representations, at the systems and cel-
lular level (Gallese et al. 2004, Rizzolatti &
Craighero 2004), that are engaged both when
we plan to execute an action ourselves and
when we observe another person carry out the
same action. Although some of these “mirror”
representations respond only to viewing a very
speciﬁc action, the majority can abstract from
the particulars of any speciﬁc action or even sen-
sory modality to encode goal-directed inten-
tions (Fogassi et al. 2005). Together, our ability
to simulate motivational and premotor repre-
sentations of other people may ground our abil-
ity to know about other minds (Gallese 2007),
although deliberative reasoning (as formulated
in classical theory-of-mind accounts) no doubt
also plays a role. The extent to which these two
processes, automatic simulation and more de-
liberately reﬂecting on mental states, come into
play appears to depend on the demands of a
task—their engagement is thus to some extent
context-dependent (de Lange et al. 2008). It is
also interesting to note that monkeys have such
so-called “mirror neurons” but do not imitate
or appear to know about other minds, indicating
that additional enabling mechanisms, possibly
including enculturation, are required for mere
mirroring at the neural level to generate knowl-
edge of other minds (Iriki 2006). Although his-
torically it has been seen as distinct from simula-
tion, theory-of-mind ability, broadly construed,
encompasses several distinct strategies and sev-
eral neural regions with a single goal: to under-
stand the internal states that predict the behav-
ior of other people. In fact, one may consider
the outputs of a simulation/mirroring system as
the potential inputs to a mentalizing/theory-of-
mind system: We may ﬁrst generate motor rep-
resentations of how another person is perform-
ing an action (via simulation and mirroring) and
then use this representation in more ﬂexible
ways to infer the reasons and intentions behind
the observed action (Keysers & Gazzola 2007).
Here we ﬁnd another argument regarding
modularity: the idea that our ability to reason
about the minds of others, theory of mind, is
an encapsulated, modular process of some kind
(Leslie 1987). Theory-of-mind tasks, which
ask subjects to reason about the intentions and
beliefs of others, activate medial prefrontal
cortex and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ).
Complex biological motion that signals ani-
macy activates high-level visual regions at the
interface between processing streams for object
identiﬁcation (which includes the FFA; see
sidebar Face Processing and Modularity) and
visually guided action in the posterior superior
temporal cortex (Schultz et al. 2005). This re-
gion is adjacent to, and one of the likely sources
of input to, the TPJ, which in turn is involved
in taking different spatial perspectives as well as
the perspective of another person when we have
to imagine their beliefs. The argument about
the modularity of the TPJ arises from ﬁndings,
on the one hand, that lesions within it impair
the ability to attribute beliefs to others (Samson
et al. 2004) and that it is activated selectively
when we imagine the beliefs of somebody else
(Saxe 2005), versus ﬁndings, on the other hand,
that it is also activated when we redirect our
attention in nonsocial tasks (Mitchell 2007).
There is less debate about the role of the me-
dial prefrontal cortex in theory-of-mind abili-
ties, as it is consistently activated when we think
about other people’s internal states (Amodio
& Frith 2006, Saxe & Powell 2006). This re-
gion is activated when we need to infer the cur-
rent beliefs of another person, evaluate their
longer-term traits and dispositions, and when
we think about our own minds. In fact, it is
also activated when we think about the minds
of animals (Mitchell et al. 2005). In short, it
appears to come into play whenever we think
about the mind at all, something that we may
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do spontaneously when we are not engaged with
the external world (Buckner & Carroll 2006,
Mitchell et al. 2002). Another region activated
in theory-of-mind tasks and likely involved in
generating knowledge of both our own mind
and the minds of others is the posterior cingu-
late cortex (Saxe & Powell 2006), a region that
shows functional coupling with the medial pre-
frontal cortex at rest.
Modulating Social Cognition:
Context and Regulation
It is likely that a similar story obtains for stim-
uli in all sensory modalities: There is process-
ing that contributes to what we are conscious
of, as well as processing that operates below
the level of conscious reportability and discrim-
ination; different properties of stimuli are pro-
cessed in partly segregated but parallel process-
ing streams; and this sensory processing is then
associated with a variety of factors that deter-
mine its saliency and ultimately inﬂuence its
deployment toward behavior. This largely
feed-forward view of processing needs to be
tempered by the fact that there is massive feed-
back everywhere in the brain, structurally of-
ten greater than the feed-forward projections.
For instance, the amygdala projects back to all
levels of cortical visual processing, those from
which it receives input as well as earlier ones
from which it does not, positioning it to inﬂu-
ence visual information processing in a global
fashion (Freese & Amaral 2005). Some of this
feedback from “higher” to “lower” structures
also implements aspects of controlled process-
ing, such as emotion regulation (indicated by
separate arrows in Figure 2b, although it in
fact arises from some of the structures shown,
notably the prefrontal cortex).
Social behavior depends critically on con-
text and intention, a sensitivity that arises from
the rich interplay between controlled and au-
tomatic processing of social information, and a
modulation long emphasized within social psy-
chology (Todorov et al. 2006). One way of view-
ing such modulations is to think of an initial
feed-forward sweep of social information pro-
cessing that is rapid and automatic, followed by
cycles of additional processing that are biased
by the ﬁrst, but modulated by top-down effects
that may incorporate controlled processing and
conscious intent (Cunningham & Zelazo 2007).
There are numerous examples at all levels of
processing showing how contextual informa-
tion modulates, or even gates, social informa-
tion processing. At the sensory perceptual level,
information about faces is processed differently
depending on context. Thus, a surprised face
can be interpreted as looking afraid or looking
happy, depending on a preceding sentence (Kim
et al. 2004). Afraid and angry faces are inter-
preted differently depending on whether their
gaze is direct or averted (Adams & Kleck 2003).
Some context modulates what we counterfactu-
ally expect might happen. Thus, in the exam-
ple of social norm compliance, brain structures
associated with strong emotions are activated
only when the subject knows that punishment is
possible, not when it is known to be impossible
(Spitzer et al. 2007). An important and common
ﬁnding (often utilized as a control condition in
imaging studies) is that knowing that a partic-
ular event or outcome was intentionally caused
by another person leads to a different interpre-
tation than knowing that the event was uninten-
tional or was caused by a computer. Thus, in
the case of the negative emotions and ante-
rior cingulate activation induced by social ex-
clusion, this obtains only when the subject is
convinced that other people are volitionally ex-
cluding him or her, not when the “exclusion”
is explained as a technical malfunction of some
sort (Eisenberger et al. 2003). What we know
about people from their past behavior provides
an important context that modulates our re-
sponses to, and actions toward, others. In stud-
ies of empathy, it was found that our perception
of other people’s fairness (from their behavior
in an economic game) modulated how much
empathy was felt when they were observed to
be given painful electric shock, an effect that
correlated with activation of the insula (Singer
et al. 2006).
Emotional responses can be modulated
not only by context, but also volitionally by
www.annualreviews.org • The Social Brain 707
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reinterpreting a situation, or indeed solely by
willful control. This is effortful, develops rel-
atively late in childhood and adolescence, and
depends on the prefrontal cortex (Ochsner &
Gross 2005). Although it is somewhat simplis-
tic, one useful heuristic is that more anterior re-
gions within prefrontal cortex can exert cogni-
tive control over successively posterior regions
(Koechlin et al. 2003), an idea consistent with
the role of frontal polar cortex (Brodmann’s area
10, the most-anterior part of the brain) in over-
riding ongoing processing to explore new op-
tions in nonstationary environments (Daw et al.
2006). Interestingly, as we reviewed above,
frontal polar cortex also appears to be a region
that has expanded the most in human evolution
(Semendeferi et al. 2001), and it is a region
activated when we need to explicitly represent
another person’s mind as distinct from our own
or the state of the world (Amodio & Frith 2006).
Such a role may be critical to social communi-
cation, cooperation, and deception, and it may
be unique to humans (Saxe 2006).
Another distinction that can be made is be-
tween sustained and volitional control on the
one hand, and interruption of ongoing pro-
cessing triggered by monitoring conﬂict on the
other. These two functions have been argued
to be subserved by dorsolateral regions of the
prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, respectively (Miller & Cohen 2001). Cog-
nitive control can extend to explicit regula-
tion of one’s own thoughts: One entertaining
study found evidence for these two structures
in sustained and transient suppression of for-
bidden thoughts (about a white bear in the ex-
periment) (Mitchell et al. 2007). Other exam-
ples of the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex in cognitive control abound. For in-
stance, it is activated when shorter-term reward
(which activates reward-related regions such as
the ventral striatum and medial frontal cortex)
must be foregone in lieu of longer-term reward
(McClure et al. 2004). It is also activated in
moral judgment tasks when an emotionally pre-
potent moral judgment must be overridden (in
the fashion that Kant had in mind) to arrive at
the decision that is best in terms of aggregate
welfare (Greene et al. 2004). Moral dilemmas
that pit strongly emotional outcomes against
equally strong utilitarian considerations (e.g.,
smothering one’s baby to prevent it from cry-
ing and giving away a group of people hiding
in wartime) engage substantial cognitive con-
ﬂict, and people do not give unanimous answers
to such dilemmas. The proportion of cold util-
itarian answers (e.g., smothering the baby) is
increased by damage to regions that normally
engage strong social emotions, such as the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Koenigs et al.
2007), a ﬁnding we noted above. One could
speculate that damage to the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex might result in the converse im-
pairment: a larger proportion of emotional de-
ontological answers (e.g., not smothering the
baby, because this is felt to be too abhorrent
and one cannot override the strong emotional
aversion). The way in which our laws assign
blame and dole out punishment also captures
an important context effect: an interaction be-
tween the harmful consequences of an action,
and the belief and intention of the person carry-
ing it out. When examining good or bad conse-
quences (e.g., somebody drank poison and died
or drank water and lived) interacting with be-
lief (e.g., the person offering the drink believed
it was poison or did not), the results showed
a strong interaction of the outcome with the
belief. This interaction corresponded to acti-
vation of the TPJ (Young et al. 2007), a region
discussed above in the representation of another
mind’s belief.
Interpretation of context and degree of con-
trol vary from person to person, and so it is
perhaps not surprising that substantial individ-
ual differences exist in many of the processes
and structures discussed above. In the case of
empathy and the insula, individual differences
exist on empathy questionnaires that correlate
with the degree of insula activation. In the case
of the amygdala, individual differences in anx-
iety correlate with amygdala activation to fa-
cial expressions, and there are now some in-
tensively investigated genetic polymorphisms
that are know to inﬂuence amygdala activa-
tion and may predispose to psychiatric illness
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(Meyer-Lindenberg & Weinberger 2006, Skuse
2006). One particularly interesting story is a
polymorphism in a gene that affects the level
of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain
(known to be involved in afﬁliative behaviors
and inﬂuenced by drugs such as Prozac and ec-
stasy). The polymorphism (corresponding to
two different but relatively common alleles)
correlates with mood disorders and modulates
the strength of cognitive control over amyg-
dala processing by the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, likely a substrate of emotion regulation
(Pezawas et al. 2005).
CONCLUSION
Although many open questions remain, several
of them linked to technical issues in measure-
ment and analysis (see sidebar Future Chal-
lenges), it seems clear that human social cogni-
tion is both special and ubiquitous. It draws on
many of the same brain structures involved in
perception, cognition, and behavior more gen-
erally, but specialization may be evident at the
level of neural processing as well (see sidebar
Face Processing and Modularity). What then
is it that distinguishes human social cognition
from that of other species? Three prominent
differences discussed above are: the ability to
shift one’s conscious experience to places and
times outside the here-and-now, and into the
viewpoint of another mind (Buckner & Carroll
2006, Suddendorf & Corballis 1997); the asso-
ciation of our evaluation of others with strong
moral emotions that motivate particular aspects
of social behavior, such as altruistic punishment
(Fehr & Gaechter 2002); and the ability to use
these abilities ﬂexibly as a function of context,
across considerable time intervals, and with the
FUTURE CHALLENGES
To understand the function of a neural structure, we need to know
all its inputs and outputs, a description that is difﬁcult to obtain
in humans but becoming possible in some animal models. For
instance, how olfactory information about a mate interacts with
reward systems during mating to result in pair-bonding behavior
of prairie voles has been worked out in spectacular detail (Insel &
Young 2001, Young & Wang 2004). Two recent technical devel-
opments in magnetic resonance imaging are beginning to sketch
such a picture also in humans: Diffusion imaging is providing in-
formation about the structural connectivity of the human brain,
and functional connectivity modeling is providing estimates of
information ﬂow between structures; a currently hot area of de-
velopment is integrating these two sources of connectivity infor-
mation (Friston et al. 2003, Jbabdi et al. 2007). One functional
network is the so-called default or resting-state network, ﬁrst
identiﬁed on the basis of positron emission tomography stud-
ies and thought to be active during rest, deactivated when we
process external stimuli or engage in an externally directed task
(Gusnard & Raichle 2001), and subserving processes that include
perspective taking and self-reﬂection (Buckner & Carroll 2006).
It may be one aspect of the automatic human propensity to think
about what might happen, or what will happen in the future, in
order to prepare ourselves and plan our behavior (Bar 2007). It is
also intriguing to note that people with autism, who are impaired
in social functioning, do not activate this same network at rest
(Kennedy et al. 2006).
help of a prodigious episodic memory that helps
us to keep track of a large number of other in-
dividuals and their past behavior (Stevens et al.
2005). When the demands on social cognition
become severe, these three abilities taken to-
gether may deﬁne much of the nature of hu-
man conscious experience and indeed provide
an argument for its emergence.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. Inferring what is going on inside other people’s minds from their observed behavior may
be a uniquely human ability, although other primates show precursors to this ability.
2. The ability to infer others’ mental states is thought to be an important contributor to
human culture and civilization.
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3. Although many different psychological processes contribute to social cognition, they are
often grouped into two broad categories: those related to automatic processing driven
more by the stimuli and those related to controlled processing driven more by the person’s
goals and intentions.
4. Social information processing looks in many respects different from nonsocial informa-
tion processing. This has provided support for some schemes that claim social information
processing is modular.
5. The amygdala is a structure in the medial temporal lobe important to regulating social
behavior and recognizing emotional facial expressions. However, recent work suggests
its role is quite abstract and not speciﬁc to social cognition.
6. The orbitofrontal cortex is a region of cortex in the frontal lobes that is involved in
reward processing. Lesions of this region in humans result in severe impairments in
real-life social behavior despite cognition in other domains that is otherwise relatively
intact.
7. The insula is a region of cortex buried underneath the frontal cortex that is involved
in representing states of our own body, such as pain. It is also involved when we feel
empathy for others, such as when we observe somebody else in pain.
8. Social cognition is sensitive to context, and the brain regions involved in social cognition
are modulated in their activation by social context and volitional regulation.
9. Two hypotheses about how we infer other people’s mental states are that we do so by
simulation and empathy (abilities that involve regions such as the premotor cortex and
the insula) or via more deliberate theory-of-mind abilities (which involve regions such
as the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporoparietal junction).
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Figure 2b
The schematic outlines a set of processes related more to emotion and empathic simulation ( yellow and red
boxes, left), and a set of processes related to detailed perception of faces, biological motion, and theory of
mind (blue boxes, right). Although there are many examples of processes from the list on the left being dis-
tinct from, or in opposition to, processes from the list on the right, the two often complement one another
and come into play concurrently. All boxes can be modulated by controlled processing and context,
although the extent of this is greatest for the more central processes (different shading of arrows, right).
This schematic omits the substantial cross-talk between all of the boxes shown as well as the important role
of feedback from “higher” to “lower” structures, part of which is encompassed by the self-regulation and
reappraisal modulations (black arrows). (Modified from Adolphs 2003, Adolphs & Spezio 2008.)
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